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Few subjects in recent years have brought greater public attention to
constitutional law than that of religious expression. The pledge of allegiance
moved out of the school classroom last summer and to the center of the
Presidential campaign.' Evangelical broadcasters, notably Jimmy Swaggart,
have traded charges not only on the air but also in court. 2 A ten year
old North Carolinian named Duffy Strode almost brought his school to
a halt by preaching on the sidewalk. 3 Movie audiences in many communities
nearly came to blows with deeply religious protestors who found sacrilegious
or even blasphemous the film version of Last Temptation of Christ.4
No recent Christmas has passed without widely publicized litigation
over nativity scenes on public property; the latest challenge to such displays
was recently decided by the Supreme Court.' Barely had the courts ruled
on claims by student religious groups to hold meetings in vacant classrooms 6
than Congress passed a special law that guarantees student religious groups
a right of access.'
* This speech was given at the Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture, February
23, 1989 on the University of Missouri-Columbia campus.
** President, University of Virginia; George M. Kaufman Professor of Law.
1. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
2. See, e.g., Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
3. Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1988, at Bl, col. 6.
4. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1988, at All, col. 1.
5. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, (1989).
6. See, Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist.,
669 F.2d. 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (Supp. 1985).
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Even this list is incomplete. But it should suggest why the subject of
religious expression has been so much in the news in recent months, and
why it is not likely to disappear or become less visible in the 1990's.
I. T i CONSITrUTIONAL CONTEXT
Issues of religious expression have been before the Supreme Court
several times. Only once has its special character received central attention.
The key case, Chess v. Widmar,8 arose in Missouri, in fact, from another
campus of the University of Missouri. A student evangelical group named
Cornerstone had for several years held regular meetings in vacant classrooms
and in the student center at the University of Missouri-Kansas City campus.
In 1977 University officials told the group it could no longer meet on
campus; its gatherings appeared to violate a rule of the Board of Curators
which barred the use of University facilities "for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching."
Members of Cornerstone went promptly to federal court seeking redress
under both the speech and religion clauses of the first amendment. They
also claimed the University's ban denied them equal protection. The Uni-
versity defended its action partly on federal constitutional grounds, arguing
that permitting such a group to meet on public property would violate the
establishment clause. University lawyers also invoked Missouri's unusually
rigorous view of the relationship of church and state-a strict wall of
separation to which the high Court had in fact deferred several years
before.9
The district court upheld the University's ban and dismissed the suit. 0
For the trial judge, the establishment issue was central. University officials
could, he reasoned, exclude religious expression even where non-religious
speech was welcome. But the Court of Appeals reversed." It found the
University's ban to be content-based discrimination against a protected form
of speech. The appeals court also deemed merely incidental whatever benefit
a religious group might derive from using University facilities. Such benefits
fell within levels tolerated by the establishment clause.
The Supreme Court eventually accepted the reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit. It affirmed, with but one dissent, in Widmar v. Vincent. 2 Justice
8. 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
9. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1988) provides:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in
aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that
no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any
church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.
10. Chess, 480 F. Supp. at 920.
11. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
12. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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Powell, writing for the majority, held that the University had created a
public forum by making space generally available to student groups. Broad
access to that forum particularly suited the educational mission of a public
university. Having opened those doors, the University could not exclude
one group or message for reasons of content. Religious expression, including
worship and discussion, "are forms of speech and association protected
by the First Amendment." 3 Barring such activity from the public forum
was, thus, abridgment of free speech, whatever might be its status as free
exercise.
Justice Powell was no more persuaded than the Court of Appeals by
the University's establishment clause claim: "[T]he question is not whether
the creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause.' 14
The majority was equally unmoved by the Missouri Constitution's principle
of separation, since a higher standard at the state level could not serve
to lessen federal constitutional rights of expression.
There were two separate opinions. Justice Stevens, who concurred in
the judgment, was more sensitive than the majority to the special interests
of the academy. Not only did a University properly guide the extracurricular
dimension of its students' lives; it also had a central role in allocating
limited resources-including on-campus space and meeting rooms-to serve
its educational mission. For Justice Stevens, a university need not prove
a "compelling state interest" every time its judgment on space allocation
was challenged. He declared: "[A] University should be allowed to decide
for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of Walt Disney
should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately
covered in the classroom."' 5 In the end, though, Justice Stevens agreed
with the majority. Since there was no serious risk of undue benefit to, or
apparent sponsorship of, religious activity, UMKC had no constitutionally
valid reason for denying a student religious group the use of campus
space.' 6
Justice White was the lone dissenter. His was a profoundly different
view of the case. He readily agreed that a public university could, if it
wished, allow student religious groups to use campus facilities; his prior
opinions on establishment issues, in fact, showed a higher tolerance than
did those of his colleagues. But he now urged a greater deference to the
judgment UMKC had made in drawing its own line of separation. For
him "the step from the permissible to the necessary is a long one"-one
that protection of free speech or free exercise did not compel.' 7
13. Id. at 269.
14. Id. at 273.
15. Id. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 280 (Stevens, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 282 (White, J., dissenting).
1989]
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Justice White also warned that much of the contested activity was
essentially a service of worship. The majority's holding, thus, seemed to
leave universities and other public bodies without the legal capacity to
differentiate among types of religious Uses. Elusive though such a line
might be, argued Justice White, "the majority cannot seriously suggest
that no line may ever be drawn."" Finally, the students' free exercise
claim did not compel Justice White; the need to move off campus to find
a meeting place (about a block and a half) seemed to him at most an
incidental burden on religious liberty.19
The Widmai decision soon evoked more than its share of criticism.
Apart from the points made by the two separate opinions, other faults
teadily appeared. 20 Forcing a public university to violate its own state's
constitution-to vindicate federal rights-seemed a harsh remedy. There
was also concern about where the judgment left institutions that sought
guidance in dealing with very real and immediate needs. Justices Stevens
and White both remarked that universities and other public bodies now
had few tools by which to regulate. 2' There was little they could do to
check even aggressive proselytizing, open tolerance of which on public
property might imply. endorsement to a degree that weekly meetings of
Cornerstone in a back room probably would not.
Most troubling of all was the majority's casual, barely explicit assim-
ilation of religious expression (including worship) to other forms of speech.
Several old cases2 were confidently cited to support that equation. In fact,
none of those cases really proved the nature of religious expression. They
dealt in free speech terms with such matters as distribution of religioUS
literature. They had no occasion to go beyond recognizing free expression
claims of certain religious groups-Jehovah's Witnesses, most often-or
speech by others on religious themes. None of the old eases directly
addressed anything like hard-core religious worship. Nor did the earlier
cases need to consider the possible significance of religious content, since
no claim had been made in those cases that permitting such speech might
violate the establishment clause.
The implications of Widmar for other contexts were also worrisome.
Most obvious was the issue of religious group meetings in secondary school
facilities. 23 While the Court avoided suggesting that public schools incurred
18. Id. at 285 (White, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 288-89 (White, J., dissenting).
20. E.g., Ares, The Role of Meetings in the Public High School: Freedom
of Speech or Establishment of Religion?, 20 U. CAL. DAvis L. Rav. 313, 320-21,
338 (1987).
21. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 276-77 (Powell and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
22. Heffron v. International Soc. of Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640
(198i); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948).
23. E.g., Note, The Religion and Speech Clauses: A New Imbalance, 12
STErsoN L. Rv. 155, 173 (1982).
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identical obligations, that issue was too close to the surface (it was already
pending in several lower courts) to be ignored. If a state university created
a public forum by offering meeting rooms to student groups, was there
really a constitutional difference between college and high school? And if
Cornerstone could reserve rooms for organized prayer during the school
day at UMKC, why could devout high school seniors not do the same?
How, then, could one reconcile the clear line of prayer and Bible cases,
by which the Court had so assiduously kept religious worship out of the
elementary and secondary classroom?
The deepest flaw was the Court's failure to recognize that religious
expression may be profoundly different-that it is not simply speech of
which the subject happens to be religion. If all religious expression were
just ordinary speech, then the establishment clause would be virtually
confined to actions devoid of speech. That clearly has not been the historic
role of the establishment clause. Nor has it been the view of the Court
which a year earlier held, without even oral argument, that public schools
may not post on classroom walls copies of the Ten Commandments printed
with private funds.24 Clearly religious expression is different, and often
profoundly so, in ways that pose one of the most poignant dilemmas of
constitutional law.
Whenever the constitutional status of religious expression is in issue,
four quite different theories come to mind. Let me develop them briefly
to give context to the choices that lie ahead of us:
(1) Because religious expression is both free exercise of religion and
free speech, it is more fully protected than ordinary speech. This theory
reflects in part the convergence of two separate sources of constitutional
protection. It may come also from the special level of protection the courts
have given to free exercise claims--rejecting in employment cases, for
example, types of governmental constraint which might be acceptable in
the free speech context. By either route, it could be argued that religious
expression is somehow "super speech" and is, thus, doubly protected.
(2) Religious expression is neither more nor less than ordinary speech;
it, thus, enjoys the full protection of the speech and press clauses of the
first amendment, but no more. At least in the absence of clear government
sponsorship or endorsement, the establishment clause neither requires nor
permits different treatment of religious speech.
(3) Some religious speech may be clearly barred by the establishment
clause even though it is otherwise protected expression. It enjoys less
protection than comparable noh-religious expression because of its content;
speech of this type must, therefore, be kept off public property even if
there is no governmental sponsorship or endorsement.
24. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
1989]
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(4) The special nature of religious expression argues for a degree of
deference to governmental judgment that would not be suitable for other
forms of speech. The very variety of such expression-ranging from theoretical
discussion of theology to hard-core proselytizing, for example, might shape
that judgment. The varying maturity and experience of the audience might
also make a difference. Likewise, the degree to which sponsorship or
endorsement might be implied, even without direct support, could be rel-
evant. In the case of state agencies like the University of Missouri, the
strength of the state's own constitutional mandate for separation of church
and state might also shape the outcome. These and other factors would
be taken into account, and would fashion a standard of review quite
different from that appropriate to infringements on non-religious expression.
My own preference, it must be clear, is for the fourth option. Like
Justice White, I would have upheld the judgment of the UMKC officials
either way, so long as there was no evidence of discrimination against a
particular religious group, and no abridgement of advocacy or discussion
of religious issues. The judgment of the district court seemed to me quite
sound. I had hoped the case might come to rest there. Clearly it did not;
a decisive majority of the Justices, including those who have shown the
keenest sensitivity to separation of church and state, reached a very different
conclusion. That much is settled.
What needs further study, and claims the balance of this article, is
the larger question: To what degree, and in what ways, is religious expression
constitutionally different from other forms of speech and press? What I
will suggest, in several contexts, is that there are indeed differences. Those
differences cut both ways. Sometimes religious expression, because of its
content, claims greater protection. At other times it fares less well than
secular speech or press. Perhaps the only consistent principle across these
cases is the one for which I have argued from the start-that most religious
expression must be recognized for the distinctive and unique medium that
it is, and not treated simply, as speech that happens to touch on faith or
belief.
II. SPEcH THAT OFENDs RELIGIoUS FEELINGS
History is replete with examples of speech proscribed solely because it
offends religious views and beliefs. Blasphemy and sacrilege were once,
even in this country, punishable by extreme sanctions. Blasphemy statutes
remain on the books even today in some states. The text of a recently
codified Massachusetts law-albeit dating from 1697-suggests the degree
to which religiously offensive statements have drawn the wrath of law-
makers:
Whoever willfully blasphemes the holy name of God by denying,
cursing or contumeliously reproaching God, his creation, government or
final judging of the world, or by cursing or contumeliously reproaching
Jesus Christ or the holy ghost, or by cursing or by contumeliously re-
[Vol. 54
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proaching or exposing to contempt and ridicule, the holy work of God
contained in the scriptures, shall be punished by imprisonment in jail for
not more than one year or by a fine of not more than three hundred
dollars and may also be bound to good behavior.2
Blasphemy is, in fact, still carried as a separate heading in West's Decennial
Digest and in various compendia of cases and other legal materials. While
the last reported case in this country goes back about twenty years, 26
blasphemy is still recognized as an offense under other legal systems-as
witness recent events involving Satanic Verses and reprisals taken or threat-
ened against the screening of Last Temptation of Christ.27
Even within our own legal system, vestiges may be found of the ancient
abhorrence for speech that offends or demeans religious values. The origins
of the law of obscenity are in part religious; the Supreme Court's early
struggle with the definition of obscenity may partially reflect those origins.28
More recently, several states have enacted laws which, for example, forbid
the defacement or desecration of places of worship, and that go beyond
existing laws designed to punish other forms of vandalism.
Several states have recently adopted new laws which ban various forms
of harassment, including epithets and insults-religious slurs among them.29
The very first case brought under such a law in New York involved neighbors
of different faiths who had traded insults for years.30 The suit was triggered
when the Catholic greeted her Jewish neighbor on the morning of Rosh
Hashanah by shouting over the fence, "Happy Jew Day!"' 31 While laws
of this type do redress racial and ethnic offense as well, the inclusion of
religious feelings among the protected sensitivities may suggest that the
rationale which once prompted blasphemy laws has not completely vanished.
One more topic fits here. Constitutional scholars have long been puzzled
by the Supreme Court's readiness in 1942 (with even Justices Black and
Douglas joining) to uphold the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness named
Chaplinsky.32 It was this case that spawned the doctrine of "fighting words"
as an exception to freedom of speech-one that has never been overruled
and occasionally still receives nodding approval. Among the epithets charged
in the criminal complaint were Chaplinsky's curse to the arresting officer:
"You are a God-damned racketeer"-one phrase among several which the
Court found so inherently provocative as to warrant criminal sanctions.
25. MAss. GEN. LAws Ar. ch. 272, § 36 (West 1970).
26. State v. West, 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602 (1970) (blasphemy statute
held a violation of the first amendment).
27. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1988, at A4, col. 3.
28. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MiNN. L. REv. 5, 112 (1960).
29. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-7.1 (West Supp. 1989).
30. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.30 (West Supp. 1989).
31. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1982, at B1, col. 1.
32. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
19891
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The Court's rationale for the "fighting words" exception needs to be
recalled: "Such utterances [the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or fighting words] are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."" Of course, this judgment might have
occurred without a slighting reference to the deity. Yet the fact is, no later
conviction for "fighting words" has been ststained, despite language that
has seemed to be at least aS provocative and insulting.3 4
Last under the heading of religiously offensive speech, we might note
that, within the last decade, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law35
which forbids licensed broadcasters to use on the air "any obscene, indecent
or profane language"-albeit with reference more to the "obscene" and
"indecent" thInm the "profane. ' 3 6 These random examples show that the
law has actually dealt quite differently with certain categories of expression
which offend religious values or beliefs. While one would hardly expect
a modern court to sustain any of the few surviving blasphemy laws, it
seems quite progressive to sentence a Long Island housewife to a certain
number of hours of community service for wishing her neighbor a "Happy
Jew Day."
III. RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONS: PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS?
Certairi lorms lof religious communication have always been treated
diffdrently. The priest-patient privilege37 is surely the most familiar ex-
armle-a special safeguhrd for confidences between clergy and congregation.
While physicians' patients and lawyers' clients may also speak in confidence,
the explicit shield for conimunications within the religious family is highly
significant. Suppose the priest-penitent ptivilege wete challenged on estab-
lishment clause grounds. I have aiwayg assumed it would be upheld as a
reasonable effort to protect free exercise of religion in the most sensitive
of all relationships. Yet, such a judgment would represent a clear preference
for an indisputably sensitive form of religious expression-and precisely
because it is communication vital to the welfare of the religious comfimunity.
That would be true even for denominations that do not require or formalize
th confessional. I would not quarrel with that result; it seems quite
consitent with the principles I have suggested here.
33. Id. at 572. Cf. Sable Communications v, FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
34. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Cf. Sable Communications
v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1985).
36. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Cf. Sable Communications
v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
37. E.g., 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (Purdon 1982).
[Vol. 54
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More intriguing, and less familiar, is the special status of defamation
claims against religious publications. Some states, Missouri among them,38
have long viewed as legally privileged statements made by members of the
clergy to their congregations or in church publications. That privilege usually
requires proof of something approaching actual malice before one can
recover damages against a religious body or clergy member for statements
made that would elsewhere be actionable as defamation under a much
lower standard of proof.
This issue was curiously untested in California until about a year ago.
A minister of the Worldwide Church of God made disparaging comments
about another member of the church hierarchy in a speech, and later
repeated those remarks in a published article. The victim of the charges
brought suit for defamation. The minister and the church argued that a
higher standard of proof should have governed in such a case. The appellate
court agreed. 9 It found a useful analogy in the constitutional privilege,
which the media have enjoyed sipce 1964 in libel suits by public officials
or public figures. ° The California court noted the free-press basis of that
privilege; it offered an analogy for the religious press issue now pending:
"The right to free exercise of religion is a constitutional guarantee of equal
significance," ' 4' which to this court clearly deserved constitutional protection
by the same standard of proof.
Religious communications sometimes receive deference of a different
type. A recent Georgia case may illustrate. 42 A woman was denied elevation
to the Episcopal priesthood after some severely damaging statements had
been made about her private life. She brought a libel suit against the
church's commission on ministry. The court declined to reach the merits
of the claim-not because the statements would not otherwise have been
actionable, but only because they were inextricably tied to matters of
theology and the internal governance of the church: "Where resolution of
... disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into
the religious law and policy, the First and Fourteenth Amenilments mandate
that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest qcclesiastical
tribunal within a church or hierarchical policy .... -4
The last example of religious publications was decided recently by the
United States Supreme Court. A Texas statute" (similar to that of thirteen
38. E.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559-60 (MQ. Ct. App. 1987).
39. McNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 197 Cal. App. 3d 363, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 823 (1988).
40. See New York Times v. Sullivan, '376 US. 254 (1964).
41. McNair, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 372, 242 Cal. Rptr, at 832 (1988).
42. Monahan v. Sims, 163 Ga. App. 354, 294 S.E.2d 548 (192). See genfrqlly
Sciarrino, "Free Exercise" Footsteps in the Defamation Forest: Are "New Religions"
Lost?, 7 Am. J. TRLAL ADvoc. 57 (1984).
43. Monahan, 163 Ga. App. at 360, 294 S.E.2d at 552-53 (citations omitted).
44. TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 151.312 (Vernon 1982).
19891
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other states) exempts from state sales taxes all "periodicals that are published
or distributed by [a] religious faith and that consist wholly of writings
promulgating teaching of faith." The Texas appellate court rejected an
establishment clause challenge to the exemption, and a group of secular
publishers brought the issue to the high Court.45 The Justices by a 6-3
vote struck down such a clearly religious dispensation as violation of the
establishment clause.4 Preferential treatment of religious communications
in this form offended the developed principles of accommbdation between
church and state.
Such an exemption is less suspect than the Congressional action several
years ago extending the copyright on Mary Baker Eddy's Science and
Health with Key to the Scriptures, which the federal district court set aside
on first amendment challenge.47 Yet, the Texas case does test our under-
standing of how far lawmakers may go in exempting from the general
laws certaih forms of religious speech.
Let me pause for just a moment to take stock. We have now reviewed
one situation in which religious content adversely affects the degree of
protection, and another in which that content heightens the level of pro-
tection. In the two settings that remain for study, we find other intriguing
contrasts.
IV. COMPULSION TO SPEAK: RELIGIOUS GROUNDS FOR SILENCE
Normally a citizen's refusal to respond to government requires some
constitutional basis-a threat of self-incrimination, disclosure which would
impair freedom of association, or the breach of a statutory privilege. In
the absence of such grounds, an obligation to respond is presumed. Thus,
a reporter may not decline to reveal a confidential source, 8 a witness may
not refuse to testify, and an appointee to public office may not refuse to
take an oath to support the Constitution and laws of the United States
or of a state.
49
Yet, religious conviction may, almost uniquely, excuse silence. The
refusal of the Jehovah's Witness children to salute the flag is, of course,
the best known example-one to which the Supreme Court gave consti-
tutional protection in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.50 Even
more clearly a vindication of religious belief was the Court's later decision
45. Bullock v. Texas Monthly, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987),
rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
46. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
47. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 616 F.
Supp. 476 (D.D.C. 1985).
48. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
49. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
50. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
[Vol. 54
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in Torcaso v. Watkins,51 that states may not require applicants for a notary
public's commission to declare an abhorrent belief in God. Given the other
declarations that may be expected of one who seeks a government com-
mission, the special treatment of religiously based scruples is highly sig-
nificant.
The right to silence has recently arisen in one other and quite different
setting. Certain religious communities practice "shunning" as the ultimate
sanction against former members who have been excommunicated. Such
ostracism effectively cuts all bonds between the community and the rejected
member. The Pennsylvania courts some years ago recognized a cause of
action for shunning.5 2 Recently, a Washington state Jehovah's Witness who
had been shunned brought suit, citing several familiar common law torts
as the basis for recovery. The court dismissed the suit holding that "im:
position of tort damages on the Witnesses for engaging in shunning would
constitute a direct burden on religion .... Tort Liability ... would in the
long run have the same effect as prohibiting the practice and would compel
the church to abandon part of its religious teachings." 53
This judgment-protecting from tort liability one form of religiously-
based refusal to speak-might be viewed as a case of privilege, not unlike
those we considered earlier. It probably matters little whether one bases
the protection from shunning on the privileged nature of communications
within the religious community, or on the analogy to other religiously-
based refusals to speak. The result is the same. By either route, religious
reasons for speaking or not speaking receive a degree of protection denied
most other communications.
V. RELIGIOUS SPEECH ON PUBLIC PROPERTY: WDMAR APPLIED
The fourth and final area of analysis is the one with which we began in
the Widmar case-the use of public property by religious groups. The issue
was certain to reach the public schools; indeed, public school cases were
already pending in the lower courts when Widmar arose. There was great
anxiety that Widmar would serve to open the schools to meetings of student
religious groups.
In fact, of the many cases brought during the 1980's, there seem to
have been only two (including one very recent Eighth Circuit decision 4)
which extend Widmar's mandate to an elementary or secondary school.
The other cases either permitted or compelled school officials to deny such
51. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
52. See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975).
53. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987).
54. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989). For an
earlier and consistent view, see Country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School
Dist. No. 512, 560 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Kan. 1983).
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religious uses of school premises. 5 At the school level, the constraint of
the establishment clause has almost universally prevailed over the free
exercise and free speech claims. The most recent and perhaps the strongest
of these judgments, decided earlier this year,56 further limits the scope of
Widmar.
Several factors have aided this limiting process. Sometimes the invitation
to other student groups has been so narrow that no public forum is created. 7
Courts recognize the lesser maturity of the students-especially in the
elementary grades-or the far greater risk of apparent sponsorship and
endorsement. Through these cases runs a conviction that Widmar, even if
sound for the state university qampus, could not be applied to the schools
ppnsistent with the prayer, Bible, and Ten Commandments cases.
The pressure had shifted from the qourts to Congress. In 1984 the
Equal Access Act was adopted, requiring that public high schools receiving
federal funds must make their facilities available to all student groups if
those facilities were ppen to any such groups. Early tests of the act were
inevitable. There pave now been several cases, in none of which has the
plaintiff prevailed 9 Mpst courts, including the recent Ninth Circuit case, 60
avoided the lurking constitutional issues by finding that no general invitation
had ever been extended to student groups.
The broadest judgment, involving the Dollas public schools, came about
as close as a court could come to holding the statute unconstitutional while
purporting to find it inapplicable. 6' The court reviewed the pre-Equal Access
Act cases denying access, and accepted their conclusion that "establishment
clause interests of the district [must] prevail over the free exercise interests
of the [students]." ' 62 To the extent the new law sought to override those
decisions (as the legislative history clearly implied), "the act would require
an unconstitutional result .... -61 The clear conflict. between free exercise
and free speech claims on one side and establishment claims on the other
side must, thus, be resolved in favor of the latter, without regard to
55. E.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir.
1985).
56. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).
57. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d
Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (Supp. 1985). See generally Laycock, Equal Access
and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers,
81 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1986).
59. E.g., Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist,, 673 F. Supp. 1379
(M.D. Pa. 1987).
60. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).
But cf. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989).
61. Clark v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 671 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Tex.
1987).
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whatever realignment of those interests Congress may have sought to effect.
Widmar has, in short, been honored largely in the breach. The ex-
ceptions have virtually surrounded the judgment, save perhaps in the narrow
setting-state university campuses-to which it precisely applies. Elsewhere,
and especially in the public school, the establishment claim has universally
prevailed. To most of the lower courts that have heard these cases, the
guiding precept is not even deference to school officials' judgment. It is
enough that the first amendment neither compels nor allows religious group
meetings on school property during the school day.
Many intriguing issues remain under this heading: whether schools can
include invocations and benedictions at graduations and assemblies; whether
cities can provide platforms and police protection when the Pope visits
and speaks; and whether public land may be used for such symbolic
expression as nativity scenes, crosses, menorahs and the like. Late in its
1988 term the Supreme Court resolved many issues affecting the status of
seasonal displays on public property. 64 For that reason, as well as the limits
of space and endurance, I resist the temptation to pursue further the
fascinating subject of religious uses of public property-well worth an essay
by itself.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND PRINCIPLES
Let me conclude with a few observations on what I hope has been
resolved:
First and most basic, we miss the point if we view religious expression
as ordinary speech that just happens to deal with religious matters. That
has been the central flaw in the majority opinion in Widmar, a judgment
found seriously lacking the moment it stepped off the university campus.
Second, even in cases where the result may turn out to be the same-
a coincidence less common than one might expect-recognizing the dif-
ferences cannot hurt. A judgment that religious expression is entitled to
no more and no less first amendment protection than similar non-religious
speech does not make the religious element irrelevant simply because the
result may be unaffected by its presence.
Third, where activity on public property would violate the establishment
clause (even without government sponsorship), the presence of otherwise
protected speech in that activity, ordinarily, will not alter the result-unless
the interests in free exercise and free expression or both are so compelling
that they clearly outweigh the normally dominant establishment clause
constraint.
Fourth, the variety and complexity of factors present in such cases
compel us to judge each case on its own merits. Simple rules create more
64. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
1989]
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problems in this area than they solve. These are exceedingly complex issues,
and their resolution requires vomplex analysis.
Fifth, not all special situations in which religious communication merits
greater than normal protection violate the establishment clause. In the case
of an explicit preference not required by free exercise considerations (for
example, the Texas tax exemption), a violation may be found. In other
cases, where there is no use of public property or other apparent government
endorsement, a compelling free exercise claim may bolster the free expression
interest.
Finally, recognition of a special niche in the first amendment for
religious expression is long overdue. The shaping of that niche will require
much more thought and analysis.
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